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12 Myths about 
Individual Accounts for 
Social Security Reform
This article highlights research from John 
Turner's new book, Individual Accounts 
for Social Security Reform International 
Perspectives on the U.S. Debate, which was 
published by the Upjohn Institute. See p. 7 for 
details.
JL he recent federal budget proposal 
provides hundreds of billions of dollars 
to establish individual accounts as part 
of Social Security reform. The budget 
includes funding necessary to establish 
voluntary carve-out accounts, which are 
accounts that would partially replace 
Social Security. Workers who choose 
these accounts would receive reduced 
Social Security benefits, and in exchange 
would have part of their retirement 
income based on the investment 
performance of the account. The United 
Kingdom is the only high-income country 
that uses these accounts, but the number 
of British workers participating in them 
has declined by about 20 percent since 
its peak in 1993, despite growth in the 
labor force. The Pensions Commission, 
a national commission in the United 
Kingdom assigned to propose major 
reforms, has recommended abolishing 
those accounts.
This article examines 12 myths about 
individual accounts and how they would 
work if they were an option for Social 
Security participants. These myths persist 
because they contain elements of truth, 
though usually in a different context. For
example, some myths about voluntary 
carve-out accounts are true statements 
for mandatory add-on accounts that 
would be provided in addition to 
Social Security. Some myths are true in 
idealized situations but not in the actual 
implementation of individual accounts. 
Some contain elements of truth that are 
outweighed by other considerations in a 
more complete analysis.
Myth 1. Voluntary carve-out accounts 
are similar to 401(k) plans or the Thrift 
Savings Plan for federal government 
workers.
All three are individual accounts, and 
some lessons can be learned from the 
experience with 401(k) plans and the 
Thrift Savings Plan. However, in this 
context the salient feature of 401(k) plans 
and the Thrift Savings Plan is that both 
are add-on account plans. They do not 
reduce workers' Social Security benefits, 
as would occur for voluntary carve-out 
accounts. In addition, the Thrift Savings 
Plan's reported administrative cost, often 
considered a benchmark, considerably 
understates the cost of a Social Security 
program of individual accounts because 
the government subsidizes the Thrift 
Savings Plan's administrative costs.
Myth 2. Voluntary carve-out accounts 
would foster an ownership society.
Workers own outright their 401(k) 
plan accounts. However, with a voluntary 
carve-out account, while workers own the
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balance in the account, the money used 
to fund the account is a loan that workers 
must pay back with interest through a cut 
in their future Social Security benefits. 
Thus, voluntary carve-out accounts could 
be characterized as fostering a debt 
society.
Myth 3. Voluntary carve-out accounts 
would increase national savings.
Whether add-on accounts increase 
national savings is controversial (Orszag 
and Stiglitz 2001). However, voluntary 
carve-out accounts are much less likely to 
do so. The worker finances them through 
the implicit borrowing from the Social 
Security program. Also, the government 
would likely borrow for at least part of 
the transition costs of paying current 
retirees' benefits.
Myth 4. Workers would only choose 
a voluntary carve-out account if that 
choice made them better off.
Well-informed workers making 
rational decisions who voluntarily 
choose an option are made better off. 
However, in the United Kingdom, many 
workers who have chosen voluntary 
carve-out accounts have been made 
worse off because they were wrongfully 
influenced in the "misselling" scandal. 
The magnitude of their errors is immense. 
These workers have been reimbursed $26 
billion by financial service providers in 
an economy a sixth as large as United 
States.'
Myth 5. A worker's survivors would 
be better off if the worker chose a 
voluntary carve-out account.
Survivors could inherit the balance of 
the individual account if the account has 
not been annuitized. However, the worker 
with a voluntary carve-out account would 
give up some of the survivors insurance 
that Social Security provides. If that 
worker dies at a young age, the account 
balance would be small, and the survivors 
would generally be better off with the 
full survivor benefits that Social Security 
provides.
Myth 6. Individual accounts would be 
free from political risk.
Individual accounts, in principle, can 
be managed so that they are free from 
political risk. However, international
experience has shown that because they 
are created by legislators in a political 
environment, they frequently are subject 
to political risk. For example, in Sweden, 
the default fund, which most new 
participants invest in, does not invest 
in Coca Cola because of the Swedish 
government's objections to some of Coca 
Cola's policies.
Myth 7. Individual accounts would 
reduce government involvement in the 
retirement income system.
The government would probably 
provide a reduced percentage of 
retirement income if there were Social 
Security individual accounts. However, 
the Social Security Administration's 
bureaucracy could easily double due 
to the recordkeeping requirements for 
voluntary carve-out accounts (Hart et al. 
2001). The government would also have 
an expanded role through its regulatory 
oversight of individual accounts.
Myth 8. Low-income workers would be 
better off with individual accounts.
Low-income workers tend to not 
own stock; thus, having an individual 
account could diversify their sources of 
retirement income. However, workers 
with low income are poorly situated to 
bear stock market risk because of their 
limited ability to absorb downside risk. 
Also, the rate of return that low-income 
workers receive from Social Security 
tends to be higher than for higher-income 
workers because of the progressivity of 
Social Security's benefit formula. The 
taxation of the Social Security benefits 
of higher earners further reduces their 
rate of return from Social Security. Thus, 
high-income workers have more to gain 
from individual accounts that substitute 
for Social Security than do low-income 
workers. In addition, the level of financial 
literacy among low-income workers tends 
to be low, so they would be more prone 
to costly investment errors. Relatively 
few low-income workers in the United 
Kingdom participate in the voluntary 
carve-out individual accounts.
Myth 9. Workers would be good 
financial managers of their individual 
accounts.
Some workers would be good 
financial managers. However, experience
with 401(k) plans and the mandatory 
individual accounts in Sweden indicates 
that many workers make errors in 
choosing their investments and in the 
timing of changes in their investments. 
Some workers follow trends, buying 
high and selling low. Many workers who 
are financially vulnerable have a low 
level of financial literacy, and lack of 
financial literacy appears to be a cause 
of workers making investment errors. 
Demographic literacy is also important. 
Surveys have found that many workers 
underestimate their life expectancy, and 
do not understand the probability of 
living longer than their life expectancy, 
which would cause them to plan for a 
shorter retirement period than they likely 
will experience.
Myth 10. The rate of return workers 
receive from individual accounts would 
be higher than what they receive from 
Social Security.
Stocks on average earn a higher 
gross rate of return than the implicit 
rate of return workers receive on 
their contributions to Social Security. 
However, if appropriate adjustments are 
made, on average the two rates of return 
would be equivalent (Brown, Hassett, 
and Smetters 2005). Those adjustments 
include taking into account the higher 
risk in stocks, the higher administrative 
costs of individual accounts, the value 
of the various forms of insurance 
Social Security provides, the cost of 
annuitization of account balances, and 
the higher taxes ultimately needed to pay 
transition costs to an individual account 
system. The comparison also assumes 
that workers do not make serious errors 
in financial management.
Myth 11. Individual accounts would 
not redistribute income.
Individual accounts can be disbursed 
as lump sum benefits, which do not 
redistribute income. However, when 
they are annuitized, they perversely 
(regressively) redistribute income from 
low- to high-wage workers who tend 
to have longer life expectancy and thus 
receive benefits for more years. If lower- 
income workers receive lower rates of 
return than higher-income workers, that 
would also cause an adverse change in 
the distribution of retirement income.
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Myth 12. Individual accounts would 
not affect labor supply and retirement 
age because they closely link 
contributions and benefits.
There is a close link between 
contributions and the amount invested in 
an individual account. Also, individual 
accounts would not be financed by an 
explicit tax, which would distort labor 
supply. However, the volatility in stock 
and bond markets causes there to be 
a weak link between contributions 
and benefits. Further, a mandatory 
contribution, whatever its link to 
benefits, can be an implicit tax because 
it is mandatory. If the mandatory 
contributions act like an implicit tax, that 
would discourage workers from working 
and encourage them to retire. The low 
participation rates of workers in Latin 
American mandatory accounts may 
result from such an effect on their labor 
supply. In addition, a sharp downturn in 
equity markets can cause workers with 
individual accounts to delay retirement, 
with that effect occurring at a time when 
the demand for labor is reduced.
John Turner is a senior policy advisor 
at the AARP Public Policy Institute in 
Washington, D.C.
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Earnings Losses 
for Injured Workers
S' ince publishing Adequacy of 
Earnings Replacement in Workers' 
Compensation Programs in 2004 (Hunt 
2004), staff at the Upjohn Institute have 
continued to analyze the important 
policy issues discussed in the report. The 
National Academy of Social Insurance 
(NASI) study panel that produced the 
report found that earnings replacement 
for permanent partial disabilities 
in five states ranged from 29 to 46 
percent a rate far short of the 67 percent 
replacement rate specified by statute 
in these state workers' compensation 
systems. Thus, the analysis raised 
concerns about the adequacy of workers' 
compensation earnings replacement 
benefits.
The NASI study panel's
analysis raised concerns about
the adequacy of workers'
compensation earnings
replacement benefits.
However, there were some problems 
with these findings. First, employer 
representatives on the study panel 
objected to using the two-thirds 
earnings replacement standard for 
permanent partial disability (PPD) 
cases. They asserted that because 
such cases are frequently disputed 
and their compensation may be the 
result of compromise settlements, it 
is inappropriate to expect such claims 
to achieve the two-thirds standard. 
Therefore, the study panel believed 
it would be beneficial to assess the 
adequacy of temporary total disability 
benefits.
In addition, there were analytical 
issues that affected the results, even 
though the same assumptions had been 
used for studying the five states. Because
the analysis focused on aggregate wage 
losses and aggregate compensation 
payments, it implicitly weighted the 
more serious claims more heavily. The 
longer the wage loss continues, the more 
times the injured worker is counted in 
the aggregate wage losses. But is the 
policy question, what proportion of all 
the wages lost by injured workers is 
replaced? Or is it, what proportion of all 
injured workers received adequate wage 
replacement? The earlier studies answer 
the first question, but not the second.
Data Analysis
To find the answer to that question, 
the Upjohn Institute contracted with the 
State of Oregon for administrative data 
that enabled us to perform a sensitivity 
analysis of benefit adequacy in Oregon's 
workers' compensation system. Our 
empirical work uses a dataset composed 
of 46,033 Oregon workers injured 
in 1992 or 1993. They all received 
temporary disability payments of at 
least three days, or PPD compensation. 
We exclude workers with disabilities 
lasting less than three days, and those 
with missing values for certain key 
variables. We also exclude workers aged 
51 and older at the time of injury in 
order to reduce the effect of voluntary 
early retirement on postinjury wage loss 
calculations.
We have unemployment insurance 
data, which consist of quarterly wage 
records for all Oregon workers from the 
first quarter of 1988 through the fourth 
quarter of 1998. We were able to match 
98.8 percent of injured workers to their 
administrative wage records (based on a 
unique but anonymous identifier provided 
for each worker). The resulting dataset 
combines claims-related data such as date 
and type of injury, compensation benefits, 
length of absence from work, and 
demographic variables, with the pre- and
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Figure 1 Changes in Quarterly Wages Relative to Own Preinjury Wage, Injured 














.5 -4-3-2-10123 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
Pre- and postinjury quarters
postinjury wage record for each injured 
worker. We include 5 preinjury quarters, 
the quarter of injury, and 20 postinjury 
quarters.
The cumulative wage change is 
calculated by summing the differences 
between observed postinjury quarterly 
wages and the wage in the preinjury 
quarter for each injured worker. We 
include 20 postinjury quarters, although 
we do not observe earnings in all of 
them for many of the workers, due to the 
incidence of missing (unreported) wages. 
Finally, we compute the wage growth for 
uninjured workers using the same method 
and use it as a baseline against which 
to assess the earnings losses of injured 
workers.
Earnings Losses
Using a 10 percent random sample 
of all unemployment insurance wage 
records in Oregon, and ignoring the 
observations with zero for wages (a 
mixture of those who really had no 
earnings and those whose earnings were 
not reported), we find that the typical 
Oregon worker's cumulative earnings 
increased by $9,943 in 1993 dollars in the 
five years from 1993 to 1998. Average 
annual real earnings for uninjured 
Oregon workers increased from $18,306
to $23,892, or 31 percent, during these 
years. So the average increase in real 
annual earnings for uninjured workers 
in Oregon during our observation period 
was $5,586, and the total increase over 
the period was almost $10,000.
On average, the 7,480 Oregon workers 
who suffered a short-term total temporary 
disability injury (3-7 lost workdays) in 
1992 and 1993 had an earnings loss over 
five years of $1,123 when compared 
to the random sample of uninjured 
Oregon workers from the same period.
Wage losses associated with
workers' compensation claims
may be permanent.
Interestingly, only $212 of this earnings 
loss occurs in the actual quarter of injury. 
So there appears to be a persistent wage 
loss for even these relatively mild injuries 
in Oregon.
For moderate injuries involving 
between 8 and 30 days of work lost, the 
average five-year wage loss compared 
to uninjured workers is $3,545. Serious 
injuries involving 31-60 days lost work 
(6-12 weeks) carry commensurately 
more serious wage losses of $6,422. 
Severe injuries involving more than 60 
lost workdays mean an average earnings
loss of $10,359 compared to uninjured 
workers.
Figure 1 shows these results. Starting 
from the preinjury quarterly earnings 
at time t = —l, the earnings of injured 
workers (except the 3-7 day group) 
decline in the quarter of injury (t = 0) 
and in the following quarter (t= 1). 
Then earnings begin to recover but never 
overtake the earnings of the uninjured 
workers, at least not within five years. It 
takes two quarters for earnings to recover 
to the preinjury level for those with 8-30 
days lost. It takes three quarters for those 
with paid disability durations of 31-60 
days, and 7 quarters for those losing 
more than 60 days (12 weeks) of work 
to a workers' compensation claim. In 
fact, at the end of five years, those who 
were originally off work for more than 60 
days were still suffering earnings losses 
of nearly $500 per quarter compared to 
the earnings gains of uninjured workers. 
Permanent partial disability claimants 
recover their preinjury earnings by 6 
quarters following injury, but after 5 
years (20 quarters) they have similar 
continuing losses of just over $500 per 
quarter.
Earnings Replacement
Wage losses continue long after one 
might have assumed the effects of the 
injury would have ended. In fact, Figure 
1 shows that wage losses associated 
with workers' compensation claims may 
be permanent. Evidently the injury has 
produced an interruption in the income 
stream that is never fully recovered, even 
for injuries involving as little as 8 days 
off work. While wage growth returns 
to something like the same rate as for 
uninjured workers, the initial loss is never 
made up. So the question is, how is the 
workers' compensation system dealing 
with these losses?
Table 1 shows the mean wage loss, 
mean compensation paid, and real 
earnings replacement rates for the paid 
disability duration classes used earlier. 
Again, we used the preinjury earnings 
for each individual and accumulated 
losses for five years following the injury, 
as compared to the earnings growth of 
uninjured Oregon workers. Under these 
assumptions, it appears that the actual
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Table 1 Estimated Losses, Compensation, and Replacement Rates, 
by Paid Disability Duration
Aggregate real 
Groups by paid replacement rate 
duration of disability N (%)
TTD 3-7 days
TTD 8-30 days
TTD 3 1-60 days




























wage-loss replacement rate increases 
with the duration of disability, with PPD 
claimants doing the best. Of course, it 
should be pointed out that, under the 
assumption that the PPD claimants have 
lifelong (or permanent) impairments, 
their earnings losses will continue far 
beyond the five-year mark.
This in turn will serve to lower the 
replacement rate since nearly all workers' 
compensation payments have been 
completed within five years while the 
losses continue, presumably far beyond. 
But the real surprise is the continuing
nature of earnings losses after five years. 
Conclusion
Although it is clear that compensable 
workers' compensation injuries involve 
significant permanent wage loss for 
many workers, it is not clear why. 
Is this more like a displaced worker 
phenomenon? Research from the Workers 
Compensation Research Institute (2006) 
highlights the fact that a significant 
minority of injured workers do not 
achieve a "substantial" return to work,
ranging from 10 percent in Wisconsin 
and Pennsylvania to 25 percent in Texas. 
We need a better understanding of this 
research before reaching a definitive 
judgment of the adequacy of workers' 
compensation earnings replacement 
benefits.
H. Allan Hunt is assistant executive 
director, Kelly DeRango is a research fellow, 
and Eva Madly is a research associate, all at 
the Upjohn Institute.
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Mini-grant-Funded Research
The Economics of Voluntary 
Disclosure in SAT Scores
Gabrielle Chapman, Michael Conlin, 
and Stacy Dickert-Conlin 
Syracuse University
An increasing number of colleges 
have made reporting SAT I (the two- 
part standardized verbal and math test) 
scores voluntary. These schools argue 
that the test score differentials in the SAT 
are not a result of aptitude differences 
but rather biases in the test that favors 
particular groups. The game theoretic 
models of voluntary disclosure suggests 
that if revealing SAT scores is voluntary 
and slightly costly, only those students 
with the low SAT scores will withhold 
their scores (i.e., the "unraveling" 
equilibrium). All others will reveal their 
scores to avoid the assumption that 
they have extremely low scores. Using 
proprietary admissions data from a 
college with such a policy, we find that
this trend generally holds for students 
with very high SAT scores even 
conditional on observables, these students 
submit their SAT scores. Yet, applicants 
with relatively low SAT scores are less 
likely to withhold their scores than 
students with midrange SAT scores.
In addition to testing the theory of 
voluntary disclosure, two other trends in 
education policy and practice motivate 
this research. The first is the paradox 
represented by this trend toward making 
standardized test scores optional in 
college admissions paired with the 
increased reliance on standardized 
testing in other education arenas, such 
the estimated $500 million per year test 
preparation industry and President Bush's 
education reform agenda. That agenda 
includes the No Child Left Behind Act 
of 2001, which requires states to develop 
a grade by grade standardized testing 
system as a measure of accountability.
The second motivating policy issue 
for our research is the ongoing policy
challenge in higher education that seeks 
to equalize college access, particularly 
among those students historically most 
underrepresented. The differential effect 
on college access of making SAT scores 
optional in the admission process has 
not been thoroughly evaluated. After 
conditioning on observables, we find 
evidence that female applicants are still 
more likely to not submit their SAT 
scores, but we find very little evidence 
that the same is true for minorities.





Twenty percent of children under age 
18 in the United States had at least one 
immigrant parent in 2000. In California, 
by contrast, the share was more than 
double at nearly 50 percent. Since
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immigrant youth will probably comprise 
the majority of California's workforce, 
understanding the determinants of 
immigrants' educational attainment 
is imperative. In studies funded by a 
W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment 
Research Mini-Grant, I examined student 
enrollment and achievement in California 
and national data.
Analyses find that California's first 
generation immigrants, especially 
Mexicans and other Hispanics, are at 
greatest risk of being ill-prepared to 
navigate the education-driven American 
labor market. These findings buttress the 
importance of targeting resources on the 
limited-English proficient population. 
English language learners need to be 
brought "up-to-speed" linguistically 
so that they can handle the challenging 
courses necessary to successfully 
complete their careers and to prepare for 
postsecondary schooling.
These studies represent a first pass 
at isolating the effect of generational 
status on student achievement. Future 
work needs to examine how mediating 
influences such as parental engagement 
in schooling, family socioeconomic 
characteristics, and school inputs vary 
across race and ethnic groups within and 
across generations.
Single Mothers Working at 
Night: Standard Work, Child 




Working outside the "standard" 
weekday hours of 8 a.m. to 6 p.m. 
between Monday and Friday is an 
increasingly common practice in the 
United States. For example, in 1995, 
34.3 percent of all female workers in the 
United States were nonstandard workers. 
The investigation of nonstandard work is 
important for a number of reasons. First, 
workers engaged in nonstandard work 
are more likely to be assigned to routine 
jobs and to receive less training and fewer 
promotions than others. Consequently, 
these workers tend to earn less and 
are less likely than standard workers
to have health insurance and pension 
benefits. Second, nonstandard work is 
linked to a number of adverse outcomes 
for parents and children, such as work 
and family conflicts, marital instability, 
health problems for both parents and 
children, and poor educational outcomes 
for children. Finally, the majority 
of nonstandard workers work such 
schedules involuntarily and view their 
employment during nonstandard hours as 
an accommodation to labor market needs, 
not as a personal preference.
With the passage of welfare reform in 
1996, child care assistance has become 
a significant tool for helping welfare 
recipients move into the workforce and 
for helping other low-income families 
stay off welfare. Almost eight years after 
the welfare reform bill, Congress now 
debates legislation to reauthorize welfare 
reform, and child care funding remains a 
key issue. However, little is known about 
whether child care subsidies have in fact 
played a role in increasing employment 
among welfare recipients, or in general, 
among low income individuals in the 
post-welfare reform period. Even less is 
known about the effect of these subsidies 
on standard/nonstandard employment 
decisions of these individuals.
Since the passage of welfare reform, 
the employment rate of single mothers 
has continued to rise. However, leaving 
welfare does not necessarily mean 
gaining adequate work and increasing 
economic self-sufficiency. Over three- 
quarters (78 percent) of employed low- 
income single mothers are concentrated 
in typically low-wage and low- benefit 
occupations. These occupations typically 
demand a greater number of hours 
outside the standard weekday times of 8 
a.m. to 6 p.m. Welfare reform might have 
been successful so far in helping welfare 
participants secure entry-level jobs. 
However, there is a great deal of concern 
over the possibility that many former 
welfare recipients who have gone to 
work are having difficulty finding stable 
employment and are working at jobs with 
low wages and few benefits. I examine 
the capability of child care subsidies to 
help mothers find jobs with conventional 
or standard schedules, the kind of jobs 
that usually pay higher wages, provide
better benefits, and lead to long-term 
economic self-sufficiency of parents. 
My research also provides insight into 
whether the effect of child care subsidies 
on standard employment differs between 
welfare recipients and nonrecipients. This 
investigation is particularly important 
because many states give priority to 
families leaving welfare for child care 
assistance.
The empirical analysis uses data from 
the 1999 National Survey of America's 
Families (NSAF), conducted by the 
Urban Institute. Results suggest that 
child care subsidy receipt is associated 
with a 6.9-percentage-point increase 
in the probability of single mothers' 
working at standard jobs. When the 
effect of subsidy receipt is allowed to 
differ between welfare recipients and 
nonrecipients, results indicate that 
welfare recipients who are offered a child 
care subsidy are 14 percentage points 
more likely to work at standard jobs than 
others. Among nonrecipients, child care 
subsidy receipt increases standard work 
probability by only 1.8 percentage points. 
These findings underscore the important 
role of child care subsidies in helping 
low-income parents, especially welfare 
recipients, find jobs with conventional 
or standard schedules. The findings 
also point to the need for a substantial 
increase in the child care funding in 
the new welfare reform bill in order to 
enable TANF participants to achieve real 
economic security in the long term.
New and Recent Books
International Perspectives 
on the U.S. Debate
John Turner
-NEW-
"Individual accounts are often 
debated in a vacuum unrelated to any 
real world experience. John Turner, 
one of the 
nation's foremost 
experts on Social 
Security, does a 
masterful job of 
making us look 
at the experience 
with accounts 
already offered in 
many countries  
but in many 
different sizes, shapes, forms, and levels 
of risk. Whether you like accounts or 
not, you'd better read Dr. Turner's book 
if you want to engage in the Social 
Security debate in any serious way."
 C. Eugene Steuerle, Urban Institute
"The United States is engaged in 
the most significant debate over Social 
Security that it has had in 50 years. 
Fortunately, it doesn't have to rely 
on abstract analysis or ideological 
arguments. Other countries have had 
experience with the types of reforms 
we are considering. This very readable 
book provides a valuable reference 
for people interested in learning about 
international experience relevant to the 
U.S Social Security reform debate."
 Ron Gebhardtsbauer, American 
Academy of Actuaries
195 pp. $40 cloth ISBN 0-88099-283-2 
$18 paper ISBN 0-88099-282-4 / 2006.
Job Training 
That Gets Results
Ten Principles of Effective 
Employment Programs
Michael Bernick
Recognizing that training 
programs can't be all things to all 
people, Michael Bernick, a former 
director of California's Employment 
Development Department, shows the 
types of training programs that do 
work and for whom. He identifies 
ways to improve performance among 
Workforce Investment Act (WIA) 
contractors while exploring the best 
uses for state discretionary WIA funds. 
He also describes 
what it takes to 









the type of training that workers with 
disabilities must go through to get and 
retain jobs.
"With fresh insights gleaned from 
decades of experience, Michael Bernick 
addresses the human-capital challenge 
of preparing low-wage workers for the 
global economy. His realistic focus 
on incentives provides a road map 
for future policy."  Michael Milken, 
chairman, Milken Institute
"In this book, Mr. Bernick goes 
beyond the conventional social welfare 
and social services strategies for 
unemployed and low income workers. 
He shows how our nation's job training 
systems can be reshaped to get results." 
 Sen. Dianne Feinstein, D-California
273 pp. $40 cloth ISBN 0-88099-281-6 
$20 paper ISBN 0-88099-280-8 / 2005.
Licensing 
Occupations
Ensuring Quality or 
Restricting Competition?
Morris M. Kleiner
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